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Recent Developments 
COOK v. GRIERSON: 
Pursuant to the Maryland Slayer Rule, Grandchildren Have no 
Right to Inherit from their Grandfather's Intestate Estate when 
Death is a Result of an Act of Patricide by the Children's Father 
By: Jigita A. Patel 
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that grandchildren of a decedent who dies intestate cannot 
inherit from the decedent when the children's father is precluded 
from inheriting because of the Slayer'S Rule. Cook v. Grierson, 380 Md. 
502, 845 A.2d 1231 (2004). In so holding, the court found that 
grandchildren have no independent claim against a grandparent's 
estate because they were not "issue" within the meaning of the 
Maryland intestacy statute since their father was still alive. ld. at 513-
14, 845 A.2d at 1237-38. Thus, pursuant to the Slayer'S Rule, which 
specifically prohibits "anyone claiming through the slayer" from 
sharing the decedent's estate, the grandchildren were denied any 
share in their grandfather's estate. ld. at 503,845 A.2d at 1231. 
In January 2002, Frederick Charles Grierson, Jr. ("Frederick") 
died intestate, survived by his widow, his son Charles, and three 
grandchildren. Frederick died as a result of multiple stab wounds 
inflicted by his son, Charles. Charles pled guilty to second-degree 
murder and was sentenced to thirty years in prison. 
The decedent's widow, Deborah Grierson ("Deborah"), as 
personal representative of her husband's estate, filed a notice of 
disinheritance in the Orphans' Court for Anne Arundel County 
("Orphans' Court"), asserting that Charles was not entitled to a share 
in his father's estate under the Maryland Slayer'S Rule. Subsequent to 
this action, the grandchildren petitioned the Orphans' Court to 
declare their rights to inherit a share of the decedent's estate. The 
Orphans' Court denied the grandchildren'S claims, and the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed this ruling. Thereafter, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to any 
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
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The court of appeals began its analysis with a review of the 
Maryland Slayer's Rule. ld. at 505-09,845 A.2d at 1232-35. The court 
acknowledged that Maryland does not have a slayer statute; rather, 
the judiciary has formulated a Slayer's Rule in Maryland through case 
law. ld. at 505-06, 845 A.2d at 1233. The purpose· of the Rule is to 
prevent someone from "profiting by his own fraud ... or acquiring 
property by his own crime." ld. at 50S, 845 A.2d at 1233. 
The present court relied on an interpretation of the Slayer's 
Rule as enunciated in the seminal Maryland case, Price v. Hitaffer, 164 
Md. 50S, 165 A. 470 (1933), in which the court concluded a murderer 
failed to acquire a beneficial interest in the victim's estate due to his 
murderous acts. ld. at 506, 845 A.2d at 1233-34. Next, the court 
summarized the Slayer's Rule as set forth in Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. lOS, 
111-12,512 A.2d 389, 392-93 (1986), in which the court opined: 
"a person who intentionally and 
feloniously kills another may not share 
in the distribution of the decedent's 
estate as an heir by the way of statutes 
of descent and distribution, or as a 
devisee or a legatee under the 
decedent's will . . .. These· principles 
also apply to anyone claiming through 
or under the slayer." 
ld. at 508-09, 845 A.2d at 1235 (quoting Ford, 307 Md. at 111-12, 512 
A.2d at 392-93). 
The grandchildren offered two theories for claiming a right to 
inherit. Cook, 380 Md. at 510-11, 845 A.2d at 1263. First, they 
proposed Charles be treated as having predeceased the victim, 
thereby making the grandchildren "issue" pursuant to the intestacy 
statutes. ld. Second, they asserted a constructive trust theory, 
whereby Charles' interest would be held in trust for the benefit of the 
grandchildren. ld. The court flatly denied the constructive trust 
theory in light of the Price holding that a murderer never acquires an 
interest in the decedent's estate. ld. 
In response to the grandchildren's first theory, the court noted 
that, out of the forty-two states that have adopted slayer statutes, 
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twenty-seven statutes treat the slayer as having predeceased the 
decedent, thereby distributing the slayer's share of the estate to the 
slayer's heirs. Id. at 510-11, 845 A.2d at 1235-36. The remaining 
statutes regard the slayer as having disclaimed his share, or provide 
for other heirs of the decedent to split the slayer's portion. Id. 
Because there is no statute or legislative intent that elucidates the 
treatment of a slayer in Maryland, the court of appeals relied on the 
reasoning of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Carter v. Hutchison, 
707 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). Cook, 380 Md. at 511-12, 845 
A.2d at 1236-37. 
Carter involved the efforts of a great-grandchild to inherit 
from his great-grandfather who was slain by the great-grandchild's 
father. Id. The Carter court recognized two goals of the Tennessee 
slayer statute: (1) forfeiture of all rights by the slayer in the decedent's 
estate, and (2) property distribution pursuant to the Tennessee 
intestate statute. Id. After the slayer forfeited his rights in the victim's 
estate, the court distributed the property to the slayer's child because, 
pursuant to Tennessee's intestacy statute, the child qualified as 
"issue." Id. The Tennessee intestate statute defined "issue" as "all 
direct, lineal descendents of the deceased." Id. 
Applying Tennessee's construction of the slayer statute to the 
present matter, the court of appeals treated Charles as having 
forfeited his rights in the decedent's property. Id., 380 Md. at 512-13, 
845 A.2d at 1237-38. Thereafter, the court looked to Maryland's 
intestacy statute to determine whether Frederick's grandchildren 
would independently qualify as "issue" of the decedent. Id. 
Recognizing that only the Maryland legislature has the authority to 
regulate the distribution of property, the court noted the Maryland 
intestacy statute's definition of "issue" explicitly excludes lineal 
descendents of a living descendent. Id. Thus, because Charles was 
still alive, the court determined that the grandchildren were not 
"issue" within the meaning of the Maryland intestacy statute. Id. at 
513, 845 A.2d at 1237. Therefore, the court concluded that the 
grandchildren could not independently claim a share in their 
grandfather's estate pursuant to the intestacy statute. Id. 
In assessing its decision, the court of appeals stated that 
prohibiting the grandchildren from inheriting is not analogous to 
punishing them for the acts of their father. Id. at 514, 845 A.2d at 
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1237-38. The court reasoned, if Frederick had died naturally, then 
pursuant to the Maryland intestacy statute, only Frederick's surviving 
spouse and his son, Charles, would inherit. ld. Thus, the court of 
appeals determined, adopting the legal fiction that Charles had 
predeceased his father would place the grandchildren, in a better 
position than if their grandfather had died of natural causes. ld. In 
conclusion, the court stated that a change in the statutes of descent 
and distribution allowing children of the slayer to inherit "should 
come from the legislature and not the judiciary." ld. 
The interpretation of the Slayer's Rule by the court of appeals 
in Cook summons the legislature to clarify and codify the Slayer's Rule 
in Maryland so that an equitable solution is provided to the slayer's 
children. The Cook court's ruling removes all possibility for the 
slayer's children to inherit from their intestate ancestor. For instance, 
under Cook's court interpretation of the Slayer's Rule, a slayer's child 
in Maryland will never be able to inherit from any intestate ancestor if 
the child's parent caused the ancestor's death, and the parent is alive 
at the time of the ancestor's death. Conversely, if the ancestor had 
died naturally, the children may likely inherit some share of the 
ancestor's estate through their parents. Thus, to avoid punishing 
slayer's children for the acts of their parents, the Maryland legislature 
should either codify the Slayer's Rule, requiring the slayer be treated 
as "predeceased," or change the definition of "issue." 
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